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Effectiveness of the Surge

buschwhaked

NAXJA Forum User
Location
Colorado Springs
So, McCain keeps touting his judgment on the Surge and the illusion that it was the cause of the reduction in violence we saw in Iraq. To me, this just goes to show how easily people will make simple associations and how much McCain has pounced on that fact. Which to me, is lying to the American people. I'm also disappointed in my own party for not pointing this out. Now, I tested this theory the other day at work with my LT and turns out he wrote a paper on it at West Point. He's a stout Republican but agreed with me on this: The success of the Surge was not a result of more troops on the ground.

Here's my argument and keep in mind, I was there for the Surge (all 15 months of it):

The reduction of the violence in Iraq was the result of three pinnacle occurrences that would have happened whether we surged or not.

1) By late 2006, the sectarian war in Iraq was at a stand still due to the fact that there were almost no mixed Sunni Shia neighborhoods left. Clear lines had been drawn and all the Iraqi's knew where they belonged and where they didn't. This resulted in the in-fighting being brought to a stand still.

2) In early 2007, Muqtada Al Sadr has lost control of his own Shia militia, the Mahdi Army. He saw the "surge" as an oppurtunity to clean house. He declared a ceasefire which shut down all offensive operations by the Mahdi Army. Those that continued to fight were targeted and captured by us. In the mean time, he shored up his political standing within the Iraqi government, gaining more and more political power. We helped him.

3) The most significant event was the Sunni tribal "Awakening." This occured not because they like Americans, but because they saw that their areas had been purged of all Shia's and now Al Qaeda was continuing operations in their area, killing their fellow tribesmen. Growing weary of this, they decided to rid AQIZ from their area by using us to accomplish this. It's not that they liked us, they just liked AQIZ less. This "Awakening" started out west in Ramadi, not Baghdad where we actually surged our forces. This event would have occured whether the Surge happened or not.

All three of these events combined brought about a tangible drop in violence, however artificial. And none of them had anything to do with the surge.

In conclusion, I think the American's have been lied to about the "ground truth" by our politicians, and McCain is taking advantage of this lie and running with it. This, to me raises character concerns.
 
And none of them had anything to do with the surge.
You don't think moving from fortresses to forward bases made a big difference? lol

The surge wasn't just an increase in troops, it was a change in strategy, with focused troop level increases in specific areas. As you say though, some people will make simple associations, IE "surge == more troops duh"
 
ehall said:
You don't think moving from fortresses to forward bases made a big difference? lol

The surge wasn't just an increase in troops, it was a change in strategy, with focused troop level increases in specific areas. As you say though, some people will make simple associations, IE "surge == more troops duh"

Oh man, I must have missed that! Geez, I can't remember if we had one or not. Or how much time I spent there. Or whether I actually met McCain there or not! :doh: Man where was I? Somewhere south of Sadr City I think?

Yes, I know the strategy changed. And it did increase our response time to certain situations and our ability to train the local forces. But no, it had no large effect on overall levels of violence. Those three events, taken in combination though, resulted in the reduction of violence.
 
So just to be clear, it's your position that the change in strategy had nothing to do with the reduction in violence such as (1) ability to clamp down on Sadr City, (2) ability to provide close support to Awakening Council efforts, or (3) the ability of citizenry to raise comfort levels about their overall security

Well alrighty then
 
ehall said:
So just to be clear, it's your position that the change in strategy had nothing to do with the reduction in violence such as (1) ability to clamp down on Sadr City, (2) ability to provide close support to Awakening Council efforts, or (3) the ability of citizenry to raise comfort levels about their overall security

Well alrighty then
1) Sadr City is a fortress. You could clear that whole thing everyday and not "clamp" it down. Sadr City appeared "clamped" down because of MAS's ceasefire declaration.

2) The Awakening did not happen because of the Surge. If AQIZ had not worn out the Sunni's welcome, there would have been no Awakening to begin with. They approached us, not the other way around. And then they used us to arm themselves against a Shiite controlled government in Baghdad.

3) Overall security was improved because of the combination of those three events. Not strategy or troop levels.

Alrighty then?
 
buschwhaked said:
It's not that they liked us, they just liked AQIZ less.
This is so true with most countries in the Middle East. As long as they dislike our enemy more than they dislike us, they will tolerate us being there. I hope to never, ever return to that region.
 
So in 2 of your 3 points you indicate the US presence helped accomplish those points, but then you go on to say that the "Surge" didn't help accomplish anything.

You state that these things would have occured regardless of the "Surge". Would thay have been accomplished as quickly?
 
karstic said:
So in 2 of your 3 points you indicate the US presence helped accomplish those points, but then you go on to say that the "Surge" didn't help accomplish anything.

You state that these things would have occurred regardless of the "Surge". Would thay have been accomplished as quickly?
Point 2: We HELPED our enemy accomplish his long term goal, a Shiite dominated Iraqi parliament so that once we leave he can turn the country into a caliphate. A Shiite government which would in turn be a proxy for Iran. Long term planning at it's best. And MAS would probably have still declared a ceasefire no matter the strategy. He's no dumby. He knows that as long as we have the illusion of peace, we will withdraw.

Point 3: We armed the very people we were fighting against. We weren't just fighting AQIZ out west. Now that the sectarian lines are drawn, both sides armed, we've set the stage for an incredibly bloody civil war. And BTW, the Sunni fighters really didn't need our help to whoop AQIZ. Their fierce fighters in their own right.
 
buschwhaked said:
1) Sadr City is a fortress. You could clear that whole thing everyday and not "clamp" it down. Sadr City appeared "clamped" down because of MAS's ceasefire declaration.

Make up your mind dude, first you say Mookie cut the cord so that the dregs could be cleaned up now you are saying everything got quiet. Fact is that US forces rolled in and sat on the place until things got quiet <--direct result of the surge.

2) The Awakening did not happen because of the Surge.
That is what we refer to as "changing the argument"... I pointed out that the surge allowed US forces to provide close support to the Awakening Councils, now you are trying to argue that the Awakening had nothing to do with the surge. Can you stick to one argument or are you going to keep bouncing around bullshit claims every time you get cornered?
 
ehall said:
Make up your mind dude, first you say Mookie cut the cord so that the dregs could be cleaned up now you are saying everything got quiet. Fact is that US forces rolled in and sat on the place until things got quiet <--direct result of the surge.


That is what we refer to as "changing the argument"... I pointed out that the surge allowed US forces to provide close support to the Awakening Councils, now you are trying to argue that the Awakening had nothing to do with the surge. Can you stick to one argument or are you going to keep bouncing around bullshit claims every time you get cornered?

It's so much more complicated than how you put it. There were break away organizations from JAM that Mookie wanted under control. He ceased operations IOT isolate those groups and make it easier for us to target. These groups do not contain the same numbers as JAM larger, but they are much more violent and aggressive (and effective). So, as far as proportions go, overall attacks went down, but the overall effectiveness of those attacks went up. But in the end, we were effective in going after these break away organizations and diminishing their capabilities. That being said, we would have been effective targeting them anyway, with or without the Surge.

And I'm not changing the argument, you're missing the point. It's the question of what came first, the chicken or the egg. In this case, the egg came first. It was the Sunni's choosing to act on their own to regain control of their area which had nothing to do with troop levels or strategy. Why? Because where the awakening first started was in an area we did not surge in, we did not change strategy in. But seeing an oppurtunity we capatilized on it by arming them. Once the awakening started out west, we redirected the units that were slated to deploy there into Baghdad. Thereby, the actual numbers in Sunni controlled areas did not actually go up, did not surge. Did we capalize on their new found self motivation? Yes. But did they find that motivation because of the surge? No.

I'm trying not to hold your hand through this, and in fact, it's a vain effort. You are convinced that you are right. But that conviction is not based on experience or actual knowledge. You were not part of the Surge and I doubt you've ever been to Iraq. Read on the internet all you want to, but as they say, the ground truth is the only truth. And thats the truth you can't live vicariously through and cite on the web.
 
buschwhaked said:
Did we capalize on their new found self motivation? Yes.

Sounds good to me :patriot:

McCain for president!!

I served, I sure as hell wouldn't want Obama as my Commander and chief.
 
You are the one saying that none of the positive changes in Iraq were a result of the surge and trying to use that DEMONSTRABLY FALSE CLAIM to rob McCain of a fair point. I appreciate your service, but that's a fairly ridiculous statement to make, and it's grotesque that you would use such a thing to advance the candidate who actively sought out ways to abandon Iraq entirely.
 
Whether the "Surge" is a dumbed down label for a successful multi faceted strategy to combat the insurgency or just luck, the Democrats, if they get in are without a doubt going to find a way to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
Or at the very leasts, want to cut and run when the inevitable bumps in the road to pacification occur.
The insurgents are likely to find new strategies to combat progress and sabotage the effort. Electing a Democrat is likely to empower them to fight on.
 
Iraq by the numbers: Graphing the decrease in violence

By Bill RoggioDecember 17, 2007 10:32 AM
Multinational Forces-Iraq has released the data of the effects of the "surge" on the security situation. The reduction in deaths, attack trends, sectarian violence, and improvised explosive device, suicide, and car bomb attacks is dramatic. The number of weapons caches found per year has more than doubled. The graphs below have been provided by Multinational Forces Iraq.
The weekly attack trends are now down to or below 2004 levels, with fewer than 600 attacks overall reported per week. These numbers include ineffectual attacks. The number peaked during the summer of 2007, with almost 1,600 attacks in one week in June.





The number of deaths per month nationwide is down to January 2006 levels, at about 600 per month. The numbers peaked in December 2006, with about 3,000 deaths per month.






High-profile attacks: Suicide car and vest bombs, and car bombs, are down from a peak of near 130 per month to about 30 per month, the lowest level since May 2006.


The number of IED attacks are now at 2004 levels, with roughly 20 per day. This is down from the peak of 60 per day in May of this year, when the surge was peaking.





The sectarian violence in Baghdad has decreased dramatically over the past year. Areas that were hotspots now are quiet.






The number of weapons caches discovered increased by almost two and a half times from 2006 to 2007.
 
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